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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LOWELL SINGLETON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040731-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
-k * * 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits this brief 
in reply to the new matters raised in appellee's brief. 
Defendant argues that no reasonable suspicion existed because "Officer Welcker did 
not himself seem to believe he had observed specific, articulable criminal behavior on the 
part of [defendant] to justify effecting a level two detention." Aple. Brf at 12. Defendant 
reasons that because Officer Welcker testified that defendant was free to leave, the officer 
himself must not have believed that he had a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. Aple. 
Brf. at 12. This argument is a red herring. The approach an officer takes to investigate 
suspicious activity has no bearing on whether reasonable suspicion exists. Where reasonable 
suspicion exists, an officer may choose to detain the suspect or he may choose to engage in a 
consensual encounter. That decision is wholly discretionary and the officer need not detain a 
suspect simply because he can. And the fact that the officer chooses to engage in a 
consensual encounter does not affect the reasonable suspicion analysis. 
Defendant also argues that the officer did not believe there was reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity. Aple. Brf. at 12. In support of this claim, defendant points to the 
following testimony: 
Prosecutor: As you're approaching in your vehicle and stopped your 
vehicle, did you see anything occur between the two men? 
Officer: There was some hand-to-hand actions. I have no idea what 
was occurring there other than there was some hand-to-hand 
actions. 
Prosecutor: In your training and experience as a narcotics officer, could 
this possibly be an exchange for drugs? 
Officer: It could be. 
R. 97: 12. Officer Welcker never testified that there was not reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. He acknowledged that he did not know what the exchange was. But he 
also testified that the exchange was consistent with a drug transaction. Defendant thus 
overstates the officer's testimony. 
Even had Officer Welcker not believed that reasonable suspicion existed, that belief 
would not be dispositive. Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard: whether, based on 
the totality of the circumstances, "the detaining officer has a 'particularized and objective 
basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 
S.Ct. 744,750 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortex, 449 U.S. 411,417-18,101 S.Ct. 690 
(1981)). The officer's evaluation of the facts in light of his or her experience and training is 
"one of several possible articulable facts a court may consider as part of the totality of the 
circumstances." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 21, 78 P.3d 590. However, "no one factor 
alone is determinative of reasonableness." Id. 
As discussed in the State's opening brief, Aplt. Brf. at 10-12, the facts here are similar 
to, if not more compelling than, those in State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160,47 P.3d 932: the 
hand-to-hand exchange was consistent with a drug transaction, the transaction occurred in an 
area where drug deals frequently occurred, and the participants took evasive measures upon 
noticing the presence of police. Defendant argues that Beach is distinguishable because 
defendant did not run away or walk away rapidly. Aple. Brf. at 11. But while u[h]eadlong 
flight ... is the consummate act of evasion," any evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in 
determining reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,124-25,120 S.Ct. 673, 
676 (2000). Evasion need not be executed with great speed to be suggestive of wrongdoing, 
e.g., the infamous " slow speed" pursuit of OJ. Simpson in the white Ford Bronco. 
Defendant also argues that Beach is distinguishable because the vehicles were not 
obstructing traffic or otherwise in violation of the traffic laws. Aple. Brf. at 11. That factor, 
however, appears to be of nominal importance in assessing whether there was a drug 
exchange. See Beach, 2002 UT App 160, at ^ f 9. In any event, factors supporting reasonable 
suspicion are present here where they were not in Beach. For example, unlike Beach, both 
suspects in this case took evasive measures: defendant walked away upon noticing the 
officer's approach and Stephen Lundy walked around the car and began kicking something 
under the Jeep in the snow. In addition, the transaction occurred late at night with the 
3 
vehicle lights off, though the engines were running. This suggests an effort to conceal the 
nature of their transaction. 
Finally, defendant suggests that reasonable suspicion could not exist because the 
exchange might have been innocent. Aple. Brf. at 12. Reasonable suspicion, however, 
"'need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct."5 State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, \ 
10 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S.Ct. 744). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the opening brief, the State respectfully 
requests the Court to reverse the trial court's order Order of Dismissal With Prejudice and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted June 10, 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEFFREY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellant 
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